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Abstract. The rise of indirect tax non-compliance by taxpayers became 
the main concern of most of the tax authorities around the globe. In 
Malaysia, non complaince such as smuggling and illegal trade activities by 
importers involving cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles bound under 
Excise Act 1976 have caused revenue losses in monetary and non-
monetary aspects. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the 
relationship of tax rate, penalty rate and tax fairness of excise duty non-
compliance. This study uses the Deterrence Theory as a basis theory  to 
investigate the phenomenon of excise duty non complaince. A total of 500 
excise duty offenders throughout Malaysia responded to the survey. The 
model was empirically tested by using Partial Least Squares (PLS) with 
disproportionate stratified random sampling technique. The results 
indicated that the perception of tax rate and penalty rate are positively 
related while tax fairness is negatively related to excise duty non-
compliance among importers.  
 
1 Introduction  
Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD) as indirect tax authority administering 
exports and imports of commodities and collect indirect taxes. The taxes collected 
contribute as a source of revenue to the federal government. However, the tax non-
compliance occurs through unscrupulous importers by falsifying customs documents, 
under-declaration and hiding goods. Malaysia like any other countries faces a serious 
problem of Customs frauds yearly. This Customs frauds involved smuggling and illegal 
trade activities carried out by importers to avoid paying excise duty to RMCD.The 
taxpayers’ non-compliance is the main issue encountered by RMCD. This agency looses 
revenue caused by the taxpayers’ failure to pay excise duty. RMCD’s statistics indicate that 
the additional excise duty detected from illegal trade activities and smuggling offences 
totalled almost more than RM1,800 million from the year 2010 to 2014 from the 
breakdown of 14,661 cases for cigarettes, 2,592 for imported vehicles and 4,662 for liquor 
[1]. These statistics shows that the problem of non-compliance need to be highlighted. 
The tax non-compliance issue need to be investigated, in Malaysian context as 
developing country. Therefore, this study contributes  several merits. First, it uses actual 
smuggling and illegal trade offenders (importers) to measure the non-compliance behaviour 
in Malaysia. Whereas, most of the researches are done studies on tax non-compliance using 
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annual reports which do not reflect the real situation. Secondly, this study contributes to the 
body of knowledge in indirect tax non-compliance in Malaysia. Finally this study tested the 
use of deterrence theory in Malaysian indirect tax environment. Furthermore, the 
understanding on excise duty non-compliance is still incomplete. This study will provide a 
fundamental awareness to RMCD as well as other researchers around the globe based on 
smuggling and illegal trade activities prevailing as a universal phenomenon. 
 
2 Literature review and hypotheses development  
 
2.1 Deterrence Theory 
 
The Deterrence Theory by Becker [2] emphasized about economics of crime. Taxpayers are 
assumed to act under uncertainty position either to maximize their tax savings or face the 
punishment by comparing the cost incurred. This will be determined the compliance 
behaviour by weighing the chance of being detected and penalty acquisition. Based on 
explanation, this theory highlighted that by increasing tax rate and penalty rate will deter 
the non-compliance behaviour.  
 
2.2 Tax Non-compliance 
 
Tax non-compliance is defined as an illegal conduct of importers as taxpayers either done 
intentionally or unintentionally to evade taxes from tax authority. In Customs context tax 
non-compliance or tax frauds are mis-classification of tariff code, producing double 
invoices, falsifying country of origin [3].  
 
2.3 Tax rate 
 
Tax rate  in Customs context is defined as an effect of the dollar paid for the import / export 
based on the Customs Harmonized System-nomenclature classification. In Customs 
perspective Fisman and Wei [4]  found the higher the tax rates of the products the greater 
the revenue loss. Whereas In India, the effectiveness of tariff policies of customs duties 
evasion in 1990’s tax reform examined by Mishra, Subramaniam and Topalova [5]. They 
found a positive effect between import tax evasion and Customs tariffs. Kubo and Lwin [6] 
investigated on smuggling offences related to import duties in Myanmar and  identified  
increasing import duties caused smuggling. Therefore, the hypothesis developed for this 
study is: 
H1 : Tax rate is  positively related to excise duty non-compliance. 
 
 2.4 Penalty Rate 
 
Penalty is defined as a deterrent measurement used by the tax authority on  the taxpayers’ 
[7]. The first systematic non-compliance behavior model originated by Becker [2]. Becker 
[2] assumed evaders will weigh the rewards and cost if they perform criminal behaviour by 
considering the severity of penalties and the risk of detection. Virmani [8] indicated that tax 
evasion and penalty rate have positive relationship, the higher the penalty rate, will induced 
people to behave dishonestly. Hence, the hypothesis developed is : 
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H2 : Penalty rate is  positively related to excise duty non-compliance. 
 
2.5 Tax Fairness 
 
Tax fairness in tax compliance can be defined in two different dimensions. The first 
dimension is on the benefit received with the dollars paid as tax. While the other one is on 
equity and the taxpayers’ burden when referring to  other individual in tax matters [9]. 
Azmi and Perumal [10] undertaken a study to recognized fairness perception within 
Malaysians taxpayers. The result showed perceived tax fairness positively influence tax 
compliance behaviour. The related hypothesis developed is as stated below: 
H3: Tax fairness  is negatively related to excise duty non-compliance. 
 
3.      Research theoretical framework 
 
This conceptual  framework expanded from deterrence theory by considering non-
compliance determinants such as tax rate, penalty rate and tax fairness. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
4.      Research methodology 
 
This study attempted to test the hypotheses developed in excise duty non-compliance. The 
population comprises of Managers who were committed in the cigarettes, liquor and 
imported vehicles offences throughout Malaysia. The survey was administered to the 
Manager as they are directly involved in importation declaration decision making. The 
sample obtained from RMCD’s database for the year 2014.The questionnaires were 
distributed personally to 600 companies. After 4 months, 500 useable questionnaires 
returned. Therefore representing the response rate of 83%. The participating companies’ 
covers cigarette (223), followed by liquor (166) and imported vehicles (111).The items for 
all the constructs adapted from previous literatures to fit the study’s objectives. All the main 
items were measured based on 7-point Likert Scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) and 
strongly agree (7). This study’s survey items for tax rate, penalty rate and  tax fairness 
adapted from previous literatures. The tax rate items was self employed. While penalty rate 
and tax fairness adapted from Devos [11] and Gilligan and Richardson [12] respectively. 
 
5.      Findings 
 
SmartPLS version 3.2.4 which is variance based structural equation modelling (SEM) was 
employed to analyze research model based on the two-stage analytical procedures consists 
of measurement and structural model. Measurement model (outer model) tested for the 
validity and reliability of the measures. Followed by the structural model (inner model) 
evaluated by testing the hypothesized relationship. A bootstrapping method was used to test 
the path coefficient significant and the loadings [13].  
Excise Duty Non-
Compliance 
Tax Rate 
Penalty Rate
Tax Fairness
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6.      Assessment of measurement model 
 
The measurement model evaluates the relationships among the indicators and the 
constructs. Two types of validity were examined to assess the measurement model, the first 
is convergent validity followed by discriminant validity. Convergent validity is established 
by examining the indicators loadings, average variance extracted (AVE) and composite 
reliability. As shown in Table 1, indicator loadings for all items surpassed the threshold 
value of 0.50 as recommended by Hair, Hult, Ringle and Sarstedt [13]. However, the 
loadings for item tax rate item 1, penalty rate item 4, tax fairness item 3, 6 and 7 and excise 
duty non-compliance item 2,3, 4 and 6 were deleted due to low loading. The AVE values 
are higher than cut-off point of 0.50. While, composite reliability greater than value 0.70 as 
suggested by Hair et.al. [13].  
 
Table 1 Convergent validity 
Construct Items Loadings AVE CR 
Excise duty non-compliance 
(EDN) 
EDN1 
EDN5 
EDN7 
EDN8 
EDN9 
 
   0.848 
   0.723 
   0.877 
   0.816 
   0.691 
 
0.631 0.894 
Penalty rate  
(PR) 
PR1 
PR2 
PR3 
PR5 
 
   0.680 
   0.735 
   0.738 
   0.871 
 
0.577 0.844 
Tax fairness 
(TF) 
TF1 
TF2 
TF4 
TF5 
 
   0.853 
   0.893 
   0.869 
   0.852 
 
0.752 0.924 
Tax rate 
(TR) 
TR2 
TR3 
TR4 
TR5 
 
   0.800 
   0.878 
   0.807 
   0.799 
 
0.675 0.893 
Note: CR= Composite reliability; AVE average variance extracted 
 
6.1. Discriminant validity 
 
After confirming the convergent validity, the discriminant validity was assessed by using 
Fornell and Larcker [14] criterion. Discriminant validity is the degree which each construct 
differentiate from other construct in the research model. The square root of each construct’s 
AVE should exceeds than all of the correlations between the construct and other constructs 
as shown Table 2 [15].  
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Table 2 Discriminant Validity 
Construct EDN PR TF TR 
Excise Duty Non-compliance  0.794    
Penalty Rate  0.347 0.759 
Tax Fairness 0.606 0.286 0.867 
Tax Rate 0.256 0.144 0.324 0.822 
Diagonal values (bolded) are the square root of the average variance extracted while the 
other entries shows correlations. 
 
7.      Assessment of structural model 
 
The structural model assessment involves evaluating R2, path coefficient (β values) and t- 
values [13]. In this study, SmartPLS algorithm function is used to obtain the coefficient of 
determination (R2) value. The result indicates that R2 value for excise duty non-compliance 
is .403 suggesting that 40.3% of the variance in excise duty non-compliance explained by 
tax rate, penalty rate and tax fairness. A bootstrapping technique with resampling of 1000 
for 500 cases was applied to calculate the path coefficient and t- statistics values for 
hypothesized relationships. Table 3 shows the structural model’s analysis results. The 
results revealed that tax rate (β=0.056, p<0.05), penalty rate (β=0.186, p<0.01) was 
positively related while tax fairness (β=0.535,p<0.01) negatively related to excise duty non-
compliance which supported H1, H2 and H3 hypotheseses.  
 
Table 3 Path Coefficient 
Relationship Path coefficient 
(β value) 
t-value Decision 
Tax rate -> Excise duty non-compliance 0.056    1.664** Supported 
Penalty rate -> Excise duty non-compliance 0.186  4.322* Supported 
Tax fairness -> Excise duty non-compliance 0.535    13.974* Supported 
  p<0.01* ; p<0.05** 
 
8. Discussion 
The present study’s objective is to examine the relationship between tax rate, penalty rate 
and tax fairness with excise duty non-compliance. The findings revealed that tax rate is 
found to have positive relationship with excise duty non-compliance. This result is in line 
with the findings of previous literatures [4,5].However, most of the theories does not 
provide clear prediction that the higher tax rate induces tax non-compliance. Therefore, this 
study sheds the light on excise duty as indirect tax claiming that the higher tax motivates 
the greater incentives to engage in fraud. Further, the higher tax rate will make the 
importers (tax payers) weigh between the risk aversion and fines for the successful tax 
evasion. Therefore, RMCD have to emphasize on the consequences of their tax reform 
especially on cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles as the demand increases yearly. The 
solution for overcoming tax non-compliance is not by increasing excise duty (tax rate) as 
confirmed in this study. 
This result showed that penalty rate is positively related to excise duty non-
compliance. The finding is in line with previous studies by Virmani [8] and Alm, Kirchler 
and Muehlbacher [16]. The penalty imposed by RMCD is quite severe. For instance under 
Section 74 of Excise Act 1976 the penalty on evasion of excise duty is not less than 10 
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times the amount of the excise duty of RM50,000 for illegal importation. While, for illegal 
manufacture of dutiable goods is RM10, 000. However, the importers still commit offences 
under excise duty. Therefore, in order to deter non-compliance, taxpayers should be able to 
understand the tax rules and regulations provisions. The excise tariff complexity under self-
assessment in excise duty declarations has caused less confidence among importers to deter 
non-compliance. 
The statistical analysis of this study revealed that tax fairness was found to have 
negative relationship on excise duty non-compliance parallel to the findings of prior 
literatures [10]. Therefore, it is concluded the contributing factor for this phenomenon is 
based on importers perception of excise duty paid and the public goods received in return. 
Importers judged the procedural fairness on excise rules and regulations provisions applied 
to them and the Customs Officers treatments in the declaration processes. Fair treatment to 
the taxpayers  should not be like ‘cops and robbers’ that always find faults on taxpayers but 
by showing trust in them and not only deterrent behavior can solve the tax non-compliance 
phenomenon. 
This study attempted to explore the tax compliance determinants in indirect tax 
context. Furthermore, based on our understanding this is the first study in Malaysia that 
highlighted excise duty non-compliance focused on cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles 
among importers as taxpayers. Prior studies on indirect tax compliance and non-compliance 
vastly concentrated on goods and services or value added tax, import tax and sales tax. The 
application of theory mainly focused on Theory of Planned Behaviour and Theory of 
Reasoned Action as theoretical framework to predict the taxpayers’ behaviour on tax non-
compliance. Whereas, this study used Deterrence Theory in determining the importers non-
compliance behaviour. 
Moreover, this study’s findings provides implications to RMCD as tax authority and 
policy maker. This revealed importers are looking forward for more friendly treatment 
rather than penalising them. Therefore RMCD should focus more on educating them on 
excise duty rules and regulations by conducting training to the importers. Most of the 
training provided emphasized on the tax agents rather than importers. 
 
9. Conclusions, limitations and future research 
 
This study has its strength and limitations as in other studies. There is a shortage of excise 
duty non-compliance empirical studies by practitioner experiences and observations. 
Specifically, on using actual excise duty offenders in tax non-compliance study. Therefore, 
this study has its own merits utilized the actual offenders those breached the tax laws, to 
investigate tax non-compliance behaviour among importers in Malaysia. However, like any 
other tax non-compliance studies this study has limitations mainly on using survey 
questionnaires method. Some of the sensitive and embarrassing issues are unable to be 
highlighted in structured questionnaire. Therefore as a suggestion, future research should be 
conducted by applying mix method approach to attain in depth understanding on tax non-
compliance phenomenon. Further, the non-compliance behaviour is required to be extended 
and confirmed by using different methodological approaches. In line with this, several 
variables could be introduced such as peer influence, tax knowledge and corruption by 
considering probability of detection as a moderator.  
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